






















VII. NEUTRALITY AND THE TWO 
WORLD WARS 
In the preceding chapter an attempt has been n1ade to inquire into the 
possible effects upon the traditional institution of neutrality resulting from 
the changed position of war in international law. In general, it may be 
concluded that these effects, though certainly not without significance, have 
been limited in nature. Undoubtedly there is, in principle, a basic antago-
nism between the assumptions upon which a system of collective security 
must rest and neutrality. Nevertheless, the actual effects that a system of 
collective security may have upon neutrality-particularly in its tradi-
tional form-can only be judged by the extent of the obligations imposed 
upon member states, by the existence of a centralized-and operative-pro-
cedure for determining when these obligations must be fulfilled, and by the 
effectiveness of the machinery provided for ensuring that they are so ful-
filled. It should be apparent that when judged by these criteria neutrality 
can hardly be regarded as constituting at present only a matter of historical 
lnterest. 
In considering the present status of neutrality, it is of considerable im-
portance, therefore, to distinguish between the effects upon neutrality re-
sulting from the transformation in the legal position of war and those 
effects brought about by the two World Wars. Not infrequently writers 
fail to make this distinction clear, and-even worse--impute to the former 
what is clearly the consequence of the latter. This failure can only serve 
to breed confusion. In fact, however, the present decline of neutrality is 
the consequence primarily of the two World Wars and of the circumstances 
that have attended these conflicts. 
A. BELLIGERENT ENCROACHMENT UPON TRADITIONAL 
NEUTRAL RIGHTS 
It is fundamental that an equality-or an approximate equality-of neu-
tral and belligerent rights must depend, in the first place, upon an equality 
of power. Where neutrals do not possess an equality of power with bellig-
erents their interests, and hence their legal rights, will suffer accordinrly. 
This has always been the case, even in the nineteenth century. The lesson 
taught by the Napoleonic Wars, which opened the nineteenth century, 
was-in this respect-quite clear, and the strong parallel between the prac-
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tices of belligerents during the earlier wars and belligerent measures taken 
in World War I has not escaped the attention of writers. 1 
Historically, the major disputes between neutrals and belligerents have 
concerned the scope of the repressive measures permitted to belligerents 
against the trade of neutral subjects. It has long been customary to charac-
terize the problems arising with respect to neutral commerce in terms of two 
conflicting rights· the right of the neutral state to insist upon continued 
freedom of commerce for its subjects despite the existence of war and the 
right of the belligerent to prevent neutral subjects from affording assistance 
to the military effort of an enemy. More accurate, perhaps, is the charac-
terization of these problems in terms of conflicting interests rather than in 
terms of conflicting rights. Whereas the neutral's interest has been to 
suffer the least amount of belligerent interference in the trading activities 
of its subjects, the belligerent's interest has been to prevent neutrals from 
compensating for an enemy's weakness at sea. The reconciliation of these 
clearly diverse interests has never proven easy and, as the preamble to the 
Declaration of Paris stated a century ago, ''has long been the subject of 
deplorable disputes . . . giving rise to differences of opinion between 
neutrals and belligerents which may occasion serious difficulties and even 
conflicts .... '' The neutral claim-that hostilities should interfere as 
little as possible with neutral commerce-is not an unreasonable one. 
Still, the belligerent claim-that the neutral ought not to be allowed 
to compensate for an enemy's weakness-n1ay be regarded as equally 
reasonable. 
These initial observations may serve as a warning against the many 
attempts to find in the "general principles" alleged to govern neutral-
belligerent relations at sea self-evident and fixed criteria from which 
precise limits upon belligerent freedom to interfere with neutral trade can 
be deduced. In an earlier period the assumption was common that these 
general principles "of necessity" dictated a minimum of belligerent inter-
ference with neutral trade. At present it is the contrary conviction that 
forms the basis of most inquiries into the issue of "neutral rights" at sea. 
Neither position appears well taken. It is quite true that the neutral state 
has the right to demand that no repressive measures be taken by a belligerent 
against legitimate neutral commerce with an enemy, and that this neutral 
right corresponds to a duty of absention on the part of the belligerent. 
But it is hardly possible to deduce from this general principle the character 
of the neutral intercourse that must be regarded as legitimate and against 
which repressive measures by belligerents are forbidden. On the contrary, 
experience has shown that the practices establishing the respective rights 
and duties of belligerents and neutrals are not dependent upon logical de-
1 See, for example, Neutrality, Its History, Economics and Law (4 vols); Vol. II, The Napoleonic 
Period (1936), by W. Alison Phillips and Arthur H. Reede; Vol. IV, Today and Tomorrow (1936), 
by Philip C. Jessup, pp. 58-85. 
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ductions drawn from general principles but upon the character of those 
concrete circumstances attending the conduct of warfare during a particular 
historical period. 
During most of the nineteenth century a rough balance w as struck between 
the conflicting claims of neutrals and belligerents, a balance duly reflected 
in the traditional law of neutrality. If anything, the traditional law 
inclined slightly in favor of neutral interests, and in doing so recorded the 
experience of the century which was one of limited warfare . Thus one of 
the principal assumptions underlying the traditional law, as H. A. Smith 
has observed, ''is that the greater part of the world is at peace, that war 
is a temporary and local disturbance of the general order, and that the 
chief function of law is to keep the war from spreading, and to minimize 
its impact upon the normal life of the world." 2 It need hardly be pointed 
out that this assumption did not correspond-even remotely-to the con-
ditions under which the two World Wars were fought, and the decline in 
this century of the traditional institution of neutrality may be attributed, 
in the first place, to the fact that this system was designed principally to 
regulate the behavior of belligerents and non-participants in local wars, 
not in global conflicts. 
To the foregoing must be added the further consideration that the wars 
of the twentieth century have been conducted with an intensity unknown 
to the nineteenth century. It has become abundantly clear that if there is 
always a latent conflict between belligerent and neutral interests, even in a 
local war conducted with restraint and for limited purposes, the conflict 
between these interests in a major war that is total both in conduct and 
purpose becomes almost irreconcilable. On the one hand, a primary aim 
of the belligerents in recent warfare at sea has been the complete shutting 
off of enemy trade, the destruction or capture of all imports to and exports 
from enemy territory, without regard to whether this trade is carried in 
enemy or neutral bottoms. 3 On the other hand, the effect of the traditional 
law-if strictly adhered to-was to make it exceedingly difficult for the 
measures a belligerent could bring to bear at sea against an enemy's economy 
to play more than a limited role in the final decision of the war. 4 Given 
2 H. A. Smith, op. cit., p. 75· 
3 And also without regard to whether such imports to and exports from enemy territory are 
immediately destined to or originating from neutral territory (see pp. 2.84-6). 
4 This antagonism in modern war between the restraints the traditional law imposes upon 
belligerents with respect to neutral trade and the importance of cutting off the enemy's sources 
of materials for waging war cannot be emphasized too strongly. And it is probably true that 
belligerent encroachment upon traditional neutral rights at sea must be attributed as much 
to this circumstance as to the relative strength of belligerent and neutral states. Even when 
confronted with considerable neutral strength-as belligerents were so confronted at least in 
the initial stages of both World Wars-belligerents were nevertheless willing to risk neutral 
ill will, and even possible neutral intervention, in order to deny an enemy the means for con-
ducting war. 
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the transcendent importance of the economic factor in modern, and total, 
war the outcome-a steady belligerent encroachment upon traditional 
neutral rights-was hardly unexpected. 5 
In large measure, however, the mar ked predominance of belligerent in-
terests that has so clearly characterized hostilities at sea since 1914 is the 
result of developments against which neutral protests have been-from a 
strictly legal point of view-all too frequently devoid of solid foundation. 
The nineteenth century balance between neutral and belligerent was re-
flected not only in law but also in the extra-legal restraints that had 
characterized belligerent behavior. Indeed, the importance of the re-
straints hitherto accepted by belligerents, even though not demanded by 
law, can only be fully appreciated with the advantage of hindsight. Dur-
ing the 1914 and 1939 wars many of the most effective measures taken by the 
Allied Powers against neutral trade consisted of so-called "interferences by 
sovereign right.'' In theory, the essential purpose of the varied belligerent 
measures falling within this category was to cut off trade with the enemy 
by threatening to deprive neutral traders and shippers of certain advantages 
hitherto enjoyed if found-or suspected of-aiding the enemy's cause. In 
practice, these measures went far toward reducing neutral trade to a posi-
tion of near subservience to belligerent controls. 6 
Despite strong neutral protests, there were no established rules expressly 
forbidding belligerents to subject neutral commerce to strict control through 
the threat of interference by sovereign right. 7 For the most part, it would 
5 Though, of course, this is not to justify such belligerent encroachment upon traditional 
neutral rights. But it does go far in accounting for the persistence and intensity of belligerent 
efforts to restrain neutral commerce with an enemy. Of this, the history of American neutrality 
during World War I must provide the classic example. 
6 The continuation or withdrawal of these advantages depended almost entirely upon the 
discretion of the belligerent, hence the characterization of these belligerent measures as "inter-
ference by sovereign right.'' A survey of World War I practice in this respect has been made 
by Edgar Turlington (The World Wa Period (Vol. III, Neutrality, Its History, Economics and Law 
1936) pp. 67-99), who observes that there was "no system of law which a neutral could invoke 
against the action of any or all of the belligerents in prohibiting the exportation of specified 
goods from their territory; in refusing bunker supplies or ship's stores to neutral vessels; in 
forbidding their nationals to have commercial or financial dealings with the enemy or with 
neutral nationals suspected of trading with the enemy; or in requisitioning, subject to com-
pensation, ships within their ports. Against such action the neutrals had no defense except 
their economic and potential military strength" (p. 67 ). And Turlington has concl ud~d that: 
' 'On the whole, it seems safe to say that belligerent interferences by sovereign right were far 
more prejudicial to the economic life of the neutrals in the World War than were all the other 
forms of belligerent interference" (p. 151). British practice in World War II, in which the 
experience of the previous conflict was utilized and developed still further, has been described 
in detail by W. N. Medlicott, Civil History of The Second World War: The Economic Blockade (1952.\ 
Vol. I. For further remarks on World War II practice, see pp. 2.8o-2., 312. -s. . 
7 It may be contended-and neutrals occasionally have so contended-that belligerents are 
prohibited from interfering with legitimate neutral intercourse with an enemy even though 
the forms such interference might take are not expressly forbidden by law. Obviously this 
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appear, neutral protests failed to acknowledge that a significant area of 
neutral-belligerent relations depended upon the character of hostilities and 
the restraints belligerents would feel compelled to accept, not as a matter of 
strict law but for reasons of expediency. And this implied, in turn, that 
belligerent interferences with neutral trade by sovereign right could be 
contested on the political and economic levels though only with difficulty 
on a legal basis. 
Admittedly quite different considerations were raised by belligerent 
measures that clearly could be interpreted as departures from the established 
law. Here, neutral protests against what were alleged to be belligerent 
violations of traditional neutral rights at sea required belligerent justifica-
tion. In part, belligerents responded to neutral protests by maintaining 
that legally controverted measures taken against neutral trade merely 
represented a reasonable adaptation of the traditional law to the novel 
circumstances in which hostilities were being conducted. In part, bellig-
erents sought to justify measures whose legality could not otherwise be 
seriously contended for by the claim that they formed legitimate measures 
of reprisal taken in response to the unlawful behavior of an enemy. 
The belligerent contention that novel circumstances may serve to justify 
novel belligerent measures no doubt suffered from the obvious criticism 
that may always be made of this plea. Neutrals had little trouble, there-
fore, in pointing out to belligerents that once recognition is accorded to 
the plea of novel circumstances it rna y readily be used as an ins trumeo t for 
the subversion of all established law. Nor did the belligerents strengthen 
their position by claiming the right to invoke the doctrine of novel circum-
stances in their own case, and-from the neutral's point of view-for their 
O\vn interests, though invariably rejecting the same plea when invoked by 
an enemy. Thus the unreserved British condemnation of the contention 
that allegedly novel circumstances could ever serve to release the submarine 
from any of the traditionally accepted rules was seldom viewed as hindering 
support for the contention that changed conditions justified the diversion 
of neutral vessels into port for visit and search. 8 Admittedly, cogent 
considerations could be-and were-offered after 1914 in support of the 
practice of diversion. Yet there is little doubt that this practice was not 
permitted by the law as it stood at the outbreak of hostilities in 1914.9 
argument is not a particularly strong one. When seriously pressed by neutrals it has only 
succeeded in raising the broad question of the nature of the trade that might yet be regarded as 
legitimate, given the conditions in which the two World Wars were fought. 
8 The controversy over diversion formed only one among many novel measures taken by 
Great Britain, largely under the plea of novel circumstances. In part, the entire structure of 
the British "long-distance" blockade of Germany rested upon the argument that changed 
conditions required-and justified-alteration of the traditional rules governing blockade 
(see pp. 305-14). 
9 For a discussion of diversion of neutral vessels for visit and search from the point of view 
of the present law, see pp. 338-43· 
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It may, of course, be contended that novel practices are justified-even 
though constituting departures from established rules-if such practices 
do not prove destructive of the basic purposes of the law, but merely seek 
to adapt the latter to changing conditions. This argument takes on added 
force when it is once recognized that although the conditions attending 
naval warfare do change-and did change during World War I 10-states 
have nearly always shown a pronounced reluctance to amend the law 
through express agreement in order that the rules defining the character and 
scope of belligerent restraints upon neutral commerce will bear a reasonable 
relation to altered conditions. Change, if it is to come at all, must come 
through what will necessarily appear as departures from established law. 
These departures are to be condemned-so the argument runs-only if they 
strike at the basic purposes of the law, as did the resort to unrestricted 
submarine warfare against neutral shipping. On the other hand, depar-
tures are not necessarily to be condemned if they conserve these basic pur-
poses, as did the practice of requiring deviation for visit and_ search. 
Even if it is assumed that this argument is well founded it remains true 
that the standard for judging belligerent behavior is no longer rigidly 
restricted to the rules of the positive law. Instead, belligerent behavior 
is to be judged-at least in part-by the degree to which it conforms to 
the law's essential purposes (to the "spirit of the law"). Unfortunately, 
however, whereas it may prove possible to reach a reasonably clear state-
ment of the former it has always been next to impossible to state the latter 
with any degree of clarity. The traditional law regulating neutral-bellig-
erent relations at sea can probably be understood only as the product of 
conflicting interests, informed-at best-by the spirit of compromise. 
And even if it were the case that the traditional law reflected some measure 
of identity of purpose as between neutral and belligerent, this was largely 
dissipated once hostilities broke out in I9I4- 11 
lO Though this view has not always been accepted by writers. In one of his best known 
essays,John Bassett Moore endeavored to dispel the "illusion of novelty" put forth by bellig-
erents during the war of 1914-IS. International Law and Some Current Illusions (192.4), pp. 
1-39 (the essay is of the same title). A similar theme was taken up some years later by Profes-
sor Jessup, and applied to belligerent attempts during World War I to justify encroachment 
upon neutral rights. Op. cit., pp. 5~85. Professor Jessup, in emphasizing the marked similar-
ity between belligerent arguments in the Napoleonic Wars and in World War I, observed that 
the contention of "novel circumstances" has always formed the stock-in-trade of belligerents 
anxious to provide a justification for unlawful measures taken against neutral commerce.-
No doubt it is true that belligerents are often tempted to use the plea of novel conditions in 
order to rid themselves of irksome restraints. But this does not prove that the plea is neces-
sarily a belligerent hoax. The fact is that the conditions attending World War I did represent 
many elements of novelty when contrasted with the preceding wars o·f the nineteenth century_. 
11 In reviewing the difficulties confronting Great Britain in 1939, of reconciling her plans 
for the conduct of "economic warfare" with the traditional law, W. N. Medlicott (op. cit~; 
pp. 4-5) has declared that "legal definition lagged behind economic circumstance." Neverthe-
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There is a further difficulty to note at this point . The immediately pre-
ceding remarks have assumed that the controverted measures taken by 
belligerents-apart from reprisals-were readily acknowledged to be 
departures from the strict letter of the lavv. Normally, hovvever, the 
novel measures resorted to by belligerents have been viewed by the latter 
as adaptations to changed conditions permitted by, and taken within, the 
established legal framework of neutral-belligerent relations. Here again 
the belligerent's claim could not always be dismissed as a patent subterfuge 
for the justification of unlawful action. In retrospect, it is all too easy to 
fall into the error of exaggerating the degree to which the maritime powers 
of the world had by 1914 settled upon the limits of the belligerent right to 
interfere with neutral trade. In fact, many points of controversy had 
remained unresolved throughout the preceding century. A case in point 
was the all important question of trade in contraband, a question that had 
long provided the controversial core of neutral-belligerent relations. 12 
In the years preceding the outbreak of World War I an attempt was made 
to resolve these various points of controversy. The 1909 Declaration of 
London had laid down a fairly definitive code governing neutral-belligerent 
relations at sea. But the Declaration was never subsequently ratified by 
any of the signatory Powers, and although most of the belligerents an-
nounced their initial willingness in 1914 to adhere to the provisions of 
that instrument, subject to certain reservations, it was not long before the 
less, he goes on to observe that: ''The real difficulty lay in the fact that the I9I4 war had created 
conditions for which the existing prize law was unprepared, and the point at i8sue between 
Great Britain and the neutrals was, or should have been, not whether the letter of the existing 
international law was being observed, but whether the new practices demanded by the changed 
conditions of economic warfare were in accordance with the spirit of international law as it 
concerned the relations of belligerents and neutrals. The inadequacy of the existing law becomes 
clear when it is remembered that in I9I4, and indeed in I939, there had been no generally 
ratified agreement [i. e., on the subject of neutral commerce] since the Declaration of Paris in 
I856." But if Medlicott has reference to the nineteenth century "spirit of international law as 
it concerned the relations of belligerents and neutrals" it is very doubtful whether the "new 
practices demanded by the changed conditions of economic warfare" were in basic accord with 
this spirit. Of course, it may be argued instead that the decisive point was not the "spirit of 
international law" but rather the changed conditions which led belligerents to depart from 
this law-though the latter contention places the matter on a quite different basis. Medlicott 
has further observed that: "The whole approach to the problem of contraband at the Hague 
Conference was, indeed, governed by an assumption of fact which happened to be wrong, 
namely, that the control of contraband was powerless to accomplish its purpose and its only 
result was to harm neutral commerce." Yet, the "assumption of fact" referred to was based 
only in part upon technical considerations as to the capabilities of belligerents in interfering 
with neutral trade. In part, this "assumption of fact" had as its basis the expectation that for 
reasons of political expediency the traditional law would have to be observed-at least in 
broad outline. 
12 See pp. 2.63 ff. 
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Declaration was substantially abandoned by the belligerents .13 During 
World War II the London Declaration ceased to have real significance as a 
standard for judging belligerent behavior .14 In effect, then, many of the 
long-standing controversies over neutral rights at sea were never satisfac-
torily resolved. In both World Wars these controversies were to provide 
ample opportunity to belligerents for pursuing courses of action whose 
unlawful character could not be regarded as self-evident, despite neutral 
assertions to this effect. 
To the difficulties resulting from the claim of changed conditions and 
the uncertainty characterizing a substantial portion of the traditional law 
must be added the seemingly insoluble problem of belligerent reprisals at 
sea. In the :final analysis, a number of belligerent measures bearing upon 
neutral trade could scarcely be reconciled even with the most liberal inter-
pretation of the traditional law. Belligerents therefore sought to justify 
these measures by the claim that they formed a necessary-and permitted-
incidence of reprisal action taken in response to the unlawful behavior of 
an enemy. Elsewhere in this study the content of the belligerent reprisal 
measures during the two World Wars are reviewed and analyzed. 15 So also 
are the legal considerations-still largely obscure-raised by inter-bel-
13 The declaration was formally abandoned by the Allied Powers on July 7, 1916. In a 
memorandum addressed to neutral governments it was stated that the Declaration of London 
' 'could not stand the strain imposed by the test of rapidly changing conditions and tendencies 
which could not have been foreseen" and that the Allies would thereafter "confine themselves 
simply to applying the historic and admitted rules of the law of nations." 
Long before this formal action was taken the several reservations made to the Declaration 
by the Allied Powers, plus the operation of reprisal orders, had reduced its force to a vanishing 
point. 
14 An English writer has recently noted that: "The most striking difference between 1914 
and 1939 is the complete absence of the Declaration as a factor of any importance in modern 
prize law .... " S. W. D. Rowson, "Prize Law During the Second World War," p. 170. 
This is perhaps something of an overstatement. The German Prize Law Code of September 
1939 substantially followed the Declaration, and the prize codes of a number of other states 
also followed it in part. The attitude of the United States-as a neutral-with respect to the 
Declaration had certainly changed, however. Whereas in 1914 this country had urged all 
of the belligerents to accept the Declaration of London as an authoritative code of conduct, a 
similar request was not forwarded to belligerents in 1939. And whereas during the period 
1914-17 the United States depended very largely in its controversies with belligerents upon the 
provisions of the Declaration, hardly a reference was made to this instrument in American notes 
addressed to belligerents during the 1939 war. Nevertheless, the 1909 Declaration o~ London 
continues to be of some importance in an inquiry into the law regulating belligerent inter-
ference with neutral commerce, if only for the reason that it is the best indication of what the 
major naval powers were prepared to accept in the period preceding World War I. And even 
though the claim made in the preamble of the Declaration-that the rules contained therein 
"correspond in substance with the generally recognized principles of internationallaw"-was 
not altogether justified, it is true that in most respects the instrument was in accord with 
previous practice and custom. · 
15 See PP· 2.96-315· 
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ligerent reprisals which adversely affect neutral rights.l6 Here, it is 
sufficient to sketch in broad outline the controversy thus raised between 
belligerent and neutral and to observe that whatever the strictly legal 
merits of this controversy the overall effect in practice of belligerent 
reprisal measures has been to subvert the traditional rules regulating the 
scope of the measures permitted to belligerents as against neutral com-
merce. 
The right of a belligerent to take reprisal measures against an enemy 
that persists in unlawful behavior is unquestioned. However, in naval 
warfare the problem of reprisals is almost always complicated by the 
presence of neutrals. As might be expected, the position of neutral states 
consistently has been one of denying that reprisals between belligerents can 
serve to justify any infringement of neutral rights. Such infringement, it 
has been contended, can follow only from a failure on the part of the 
neutral state to fulfill its duties. Belligerents, while not denying that 
reprisals taken in response to an enemy's misconduct should avoid-as far 
as possible-affecting neutral rights, have nevertheless refused to concede 
that consideration for neutral rights constitutes an absolute restriction 
upon belligerent measures of retaliation. This conflict of opinion be-
tween neutral and belligerent has been complicated further by the fact 
that normally the unlawful acts imputed to a belligerent by an enemy 
have adversely affected neutral rights as well. In this situation the 
injured belligerent has contended that if a neutral state will not or cannot 
take the necessary steps to compel the lawbreaker to observe neutral 
rights it may not complain if the other belligerent, in the course of 
retaliating upon an enemy, resorts to similar restrictions upon neutral 
rights. And here again the reply of the neutral has been to reject the 
belligerent's contention that the latter's obligation to respect neutral 
rights is dependent upon the effectiveness of the measures taken by the 
neutral to secure belligerent respect for these rights. 
It will be readily apparent that if the belligerent's point of view is ac-
cepted the practical effect is to charge the neutral with the task of insuring 
that belligerents behave in conformity with the established law. In a 
major war the burden that ~s thereby imposed upon neutrals will usually 
16 See pp. 2.52.-8. In these later comments the attempt will be made to show that-contrary 
to the contentions of belligerents and the opinions of numerous writers-it is a misnomer to 
categorize many of the belligerent measures in question as reprisals. This follows, in part, 
for the reason that the mere inability of the neutral to resist effectively the unlawful acts by 
one belligerent against its trade-a frequent cause for so-called belligerent "reprisal" orders-is 
not a violation of a neutral's duties. Hence, even if the other belligerent is permitted-in 
principle-to restrict neutral trade in a similar manner, such measures are not to be interpreted 
as reprisals directed against the neutral. But neither may they be interpreted as reprisals 
against the enemy that has initially resorted to unlawful measures against neutral trade, since 
in taking these measures the enemy has violated no legal right of the other belligerent. For 
convenience, however, these-and other-considerations may be neglected here, and the usual 
terminology may be followed. 
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prove out of all proportion to their resources, a conclusion clearly borne 
out by the experience of the two World Wars. Add to this the considera-
tion that belligerents have been in frequent disagreement in their under-
standing of the rules regulating the scope of belligerent obligations, both 
with respect to the enemy as well as to the neutral. Given the first oppor-
tunity, therefore, it has proven relatively easy for one belligerent to charge 
an enemy with the violation of neutral rights at sea and, in the absence of 
an iinmediate cessation of the allegedly unlawful action through vigorous 
neutral response, to consider itself entitled to take appropriate measures of 
its own against neutral trade. The neutral, caught up in the belligerents' 
controversy, has generally been made the common victim of the belligerent 
difference of opinion. 17 
Nor can the essential function served by belligerent" reprisals" be over-
looked. Clearly, this function has not been to preserve the traditional 
rights of neutrals. On the contrary, the evident intent of the belligerents 
has been to use reprisals as an instrument for changing this aspect of the 
traditional law of neutrality, and it vvas primarily for this reason that 
reprisal measures became a permanent feature of naval hostilities in the 
1914 and 1939 wars. 18 Where belligerents have differed has not been in 
their resolve to use reprisals as a means for shutting off all neutral trade 
with an enemy but rather in the distinctive methods they have followed in 
pursuing this aim; and it is no less an error to refuse to recognize the effects 
this common belligerent goal has had upon the rules regulating neutral 
trade than it is to dismiss as without legal significance the varying methods 
belligerents have pursued in attempting the economic isolation of an 
enemy. 19 
17 It is equally evident, however, that if the neutral's position is endorsed the law-abiding 
belligerent is placed at a grave disadvantage. Nor can this disadvantage be characterized 
merely as one which would deprive the belligerent of striking at an offending enemy "through 
the side" of the neutral. It has already been noted that in many situations the unlawful acts 
of an enemy-affecting belligerent and neutral alike-can only be effectively countered by acts 
which equally bear upon both the offender and the neutral. Apart from strictly legal con-
siderations, there is much to be said for both the positions of belligerents and neutral. And 
it is largely for this reason that the entire problem of reprisals at sea has appeared to many as 
an insoluble dilemma. 
18 It is this consideration, above all others, that has rendered belligerent reprisal measures 
subject to severe criticisms. The rapidity with which belligerents resorted to reprisal orders 
of indefinite duration allowed hardly any conclusion other than that they welcomed an ·enemy's 
violation-or alleged violation-of law in order to resort to reprisal measures. A revealing 
discussion of the function served by reprisals has been presented by Medlicott (op. cit., pp. II2. 
ff.) in tracing the origins of the British Reprisals Order in Council of November 2.7, 1939, the 
purpose of which was to shut off all enemy exports (see p. 312.). 
19 For those observers who insist upon viewing the experience of World Wars I and II as little 
more than one long demonstration of "belligerent lawlessness" at sea, the significance of the 
various means by which belligerents sought to alter traditional neutral rights is bound to 
prove very limited. Thus, Thomas Baty (International Law in Twilight (1954), p. 105) can 
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B. THE ABANDONMENT OF TRADITIONAL NEUTRALITY BY 
NON-PARTICIPANTS: THE EMERGENCE OF uNON-BEL-
LIGERENCY'' 
The decline of neutrality cannot be attributed simply to the fact of bel-
ligerent encroachment upon traditional neutral rights. The neutral states 
as well have played an important role in effecting this decline. It is a com-
monplace that the neutrality of the nineteenth century was based very 
largely upon an attitude of indifference on the part of non-participants to 
the final outcome of a given conflict. 20 Yet, the conclusion frequently 
drawn today from this former indifference of non-participants-that the 
traditional institution of neutrality reflected the absence of solidarity and 
' ·community feeling'' 21-would appear to be almost the reverse of the 
dismiss the question of belligerent methods by declaring that at present neutrals are "ground 
between the millstones of the navally strong and weak belligerents-between the perverted 
jurisprudence of the former and the explosives of the latter." Yet it is disturbing to find that 
writers who do not share this evaluation of the two World Wars nevertheless manifest on 
occasion a similar lack of sensitivity to the significance of-and differences between-belligerent 
methods.-No doubt it is true that the British "long-distance blockade" resembled the Ger-
man unrestricted submarine warfare in the resolve to isolate the enemy economically. It is 
equally true that both systems represented departures, though in varying degree, from the 
letter of the traditional law. But the British system clearly did not resemble the German 
system in the methods pursued against neutral trade, and the differences in this respect as 
between the two systems must receive prominent emphasis. The law of neutrality at sea is, 
after all, largely a matter of method. Nor is it enough to say that had Germany possessed 
adequate surface naval power she would have pursued, in all probability, the same methods 
as Great Britain. This may well be granted, though the admission does not-and cannot-
diminish the importance of the fact that different methods were in fact followed. 
20 It should perhaps be made clear that this attitude of indifference on the part of non-partici-
pants constituted a political fact, and ought not to be considered as descriptive of a legal obligation 
imposed upon neutrals by the traditional law. It has never been required of neutral states 
that they be "indifferent" to the outcome of a war. In later pages it will be noted that the 
duty to observe a strict impartiality toward the belligerents is noc to be understood as obligating 
neutral states to entertain an attitude of indifference toward the participants and toward 
the ultimate outcome of hostilities (see pp. 2.04-5). At the same time, it would be futile to deny 
that-certain exceptional cases apart-an attitude of indifference on the part of non-participants 
did form an important part of the political sub-stratum upon which the traditional legal insti-
tution of neutrality-marked by the principle of strict impartiality-could develop and flourish. 
In this sense it is true that the traditional or classic neutrality of the nineteenth century was 
based upon an attitude of indifference on the part of non-participants, and that with the disap-
pearance of this political fact in the twentieth century the traditional legal institution of neu-
trality has become increasingly difficult to maintain. 
21 See, for example, Quincy Wright, "The Present Status of Neutrality," A.]. I. L., 34 (1940), 
pp. 407-15 and "Repeal of the Neutrality Act," A.]. I. L., 36 (1942.), pp. 15--2.4. And Lalive 
(op. cit., p. 73) points out that neutrality is increasingly viewed as "an obstacle to solidarity, 
to international organization, and to the formation of a society founded on respect for, and 
enforcement of, law." Nevertheless, these views form a clear reversal of the convictions of 
an earlier period. Thomas Baty (op. cit., pp. 107, 12.4) has noted that: "One of the most deeply 
seated convictions of the Victorian age was that belligerents must not be allowed to make their 
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truth. H anything, the strength of neutrality during the nineteenth cen-
tury may be taken as an indication of solidarity, not its absence. Neutral-
ity, it has been rightly observed, "is possible only when there is sufficient 
community of interest between the belligerents and between the belligerents 
and the neutrals to cause the latter not to care too greatly which side wins. 
Neutrality therefore depends upon the existence of enough community to 
make the outcome of a war not a matter of alarming concern to the way of 
life of non-participating States. Where the community schism runs deep, 
neutrality becomes more and more difficult to maintain. " 22 
It is at least clear that given the circumstances in which the two World 
Wars were fought non-participants have been increasingly drawn to the 
pursuit of discriminatory policies and to the abandonment of the strict im-
partiality demanded by the traditional law. 23 Thus one of the marked de-
velopments of the second World War was the emergence of so-called ''non-
belligerency," a term used to indicate the position of states that refrained 
from active participation in hostilities while at the same time abandoning 
the duties heretofore imposed upon non-participants.24 When judged by 
the standards established for non-participants by the traditional law of 
neutrality, the legal significance of" non-belligerency" does not permit of 
much doubt; insofar as it implied the abandonment by non-participants of 
the strict impartiality demanded by the traditional law it served to give rise 
to the belligerent right of reprisal. 25 When judged from a still broader 
private quarrels an excuse for disturbing the rest of the world. War might not be obsolete, 
but the belligerent must not make himself a nuisance .... The outstanding feature of our 
day is that whilst in the nineteenth century belligerents were considered a public nuisance, 
it is now the neutral who is the nuisance." Certainly, the well-known opinion of John 
Westlake, written in the pre-World War I period, that "neutrality is not morally justifiable 
unless intervention in the war is unlikely to promote justice, or could do so only at a ruinous 
cost to the neutral" (International Law, Vol. II, p. 162.) may hardly be said to have commanded 
widespread agreement. 
22 U. S. Naval War College, International Law Situations, I!))!), p. 54· 
23 The short-lived policy of "renunciatory" neutrality pursued by the United States for a 
period preceding and following the outbreak of war in 1939 forms an exception which-in 
view of later events-only seems to throw in bolder relief the strength of the forces that have 
operated in the contrary direction. From a policy in which traditional neutral rights at sea 
were renounced in favor of a self-imposed isolation that went far beyond the requirements of 
existing law, the United States rapidly moved in 1940 to a policy of discrimination and to an 
open abandonment of neutral duties that finds few parallels in the modern history of q.eu.trality. 
Elsewhere in this study the principal features of United States' neutrality legislation during 
this period are briefly reviewed (see, in particular, p. 2.10 (n)). 
24 For a discussion of the legal issues raised by "non-belligerency" in World War II, see pp. 
197-9· 
25 Unless, of course, such departure from impartiality had as its basis a treaty permitting the 
taking of discriminatory measures against a state unlawfully resorting to war (see pp. 166 ff.} · 
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perspective, however, so-called '' non-belligerency'' must be seen as a further 
manifestation of the recent decline of neutrality. 26 
C. CONCLUSIONS 
In view of the experience of the two World Wars the suggestion has been 
made that in evaluating the prospects for observance of the traditional law 
regulating neutral-belligerent relations in future conflicts, it may be useful-
as a practical measure-to distinguish between great and small wars. 27 In 
great wars, involving most of the major states and fought with the inten-
sity that characterized the two World Wars, the expectation that bellig-
erents will closely adhere to the traditional law in their behavior toward 
non-participants necessarily must prove remote . Nor is it to be expected 
that the non-participants in such wars will prove either able or willing to 
maintain a strict impartiality toward the belligerents. In a limited war, 
however, it is considered altogether possible that the belligerents may be 
required, of necessity, to refrain from subjecting non-participants to what 
has often resembled discretionary treatment. In turn, the non-participants 
may consider it in their interests to pursue a policy of strict impartiality.28 
The evident merit of this suggestion is to be found in the clear recognition 
it accords to the importance of the relative strength of belligerents and 
neutrals in estimating the future effectiveness of a legal regime that has 
served to regulate neutral-belligerent relations on the basis of an approxi-
mate equality of rights. But even if the assumption of a return to limited 
war is granted it is by no means certain that many of the rules that have 
heretofore made up the traditional system will be given effective applica-
tion. Although the contemporary decline of the traditional institution of 
neutrality must be attributed in large measure to an imbalance in the rela-
tive power of belligerents and neutrals it would surely be a serious error to 
26 Thus it is from this broader perspective that Julius Stone (op. cit., p. 405) writes: "Can 
this American (as well as the Italian non-belligerency on the other side) be reduced merely to 
violation of the traditional rules of neutrality, which Germany and the Allies respectively were 
not prepared to treat as a casus belli? Only history can finally show whether these events 
can be dismissed as a series of mere neutral infractions of neutrality, tolerated by the injured 
belligerents.' ' 
27 
''It now seems reasonable to expect that practice in future may draw a distinction between 
great wars and small, or at least between general wars involving the greater part of the world 
and limited wars in which only two or not more than a few states are engaged. There are 
indeed some signs that this distinction is already beginning to be drawn." H. A. Smith, 
op. cit., p. 75· 
28 It is, from this latter point of view, difficult to envisage two or three of the smaller states 
engaged in war successfully imposing "rationing" policies upon Great Britain (or, for that 
matter, upon any of the major powers). H anything, recent experience would appear to indi-
cate that the principal difficulty would be to obtain the endorsement of a policy of strict im-
partiality on the part of the major non-participants. 
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neglect the importance of other factors which have contributed to the pres-
ent situation. Perhaps the most significant among these other factors has 
been the gradual invalidation of an assumption fundamental to almost the 
whole of the traditional law of neutrality-that a clear distinction could be 
drawn between the public and private spheres and that the neutral state 
would not enter into economic activities long considered outside ~ts proper 
functions. It is difficult to discern what possible effect-if indeed there 
would be any effect-limited wars could have upon this growing obsoles-
cence of rules dependent for their operation upon the possibility of pre-
serving a clear distinction between neutral state and neutral trader. 29 
In any event, it must be observed that whatever the merit of the above 
suggestion it can have only a limited relevance to an inquiry into the 
present status of the traditional law governing neutral-belligerent relations. 
An analysis that is to constitute something more than speculation over 
future possibilities must concentrate instead upon an evaluation of the 
actual materials at hand, that is upon an examination of the recent behavior 
of states in applying-or failing to apply-once valid rules. In a word, 
attention must be directed to the experience of the two World Wars, how-
ever difficult it may be to assess this experience in terms of its effect upon 
the traditional law. 
In performing this task, considerations raised earlier concerning the 
relationship between the validity and the effectiveness of rules may be 
considered applicable. 30 Where, for example, belligerents have effectively 
asserted new forms of control over neutral trade on the high seas, and 
neutrals have acquiesced in such measures, the traditional law may well 
be regarded as modified. Less certain are those belligerent measures which, 
though perhaps effectively exercised, drew repeated protests from neutral 
states and which were largely justified by the belligerent claim to the right 
of reprisal against allegedly unlawful acts of an enemy. In these latter 
circumstances-and they formed the more numerous and more important 
29 See pp. 2.o9-r8 for a more detailed consideration of the present status of the distinction between 
neutral state and neutral trader, and the effect the dimming of this distinction has had upon the 
traditional law. It is only right to add that in making the suggestion that future practice 
may distinguish between great and small wars Smith draws careful attention to the profound 
changes that have occurred in the activities undertaken by the modern state and the impact 
of these changes upon the traditional law. Indeed, most recent writers have shown an acute 
awareness of the problem and of the difficulties it poses. 
ao See pp. 2.8-32.. 
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controversies between neutral and belligerent-any conclusions drawn 
from recent conflicts must necessarily prove tentative. 31 
31 It is only to be expected that in performing this task the opinions of writers will vary-at 
times considerably. For example, one well-qualified observer has recently stated: "It is now 
clear that in view of the events of the two World Wars, the Hague Conventions which regulate 
sea warfare have actually shared the fate of the Declaration of London. This is due as much 
to abuse on the part of the belligerents-particularly Germany-as to the inherent and inevitable 
weakness of a series of conventions whose intention was to protect the rights of neutrals rather 
than those of belligerents." S. W. D. Rowson, op. cit., p. 170. While recognizing the necessary 
relationship that must obtain between the effectiveness and the binding quality of law this 
opinion is regarded as extreme. It hardly seems warranted to state that Hague XIII, Concerning 
the Rights and Duties of Neutral Powers in Maritime War, "has shared the fate of the Declara-
tion of London." The Declaration of London, which sought to regulate the problem of neutral 
trade, was never ratified by the signatory states, formed from the start the object of endless 
controversy, and was openly abandoned by many of the belligerents in the opening stages of 
the first World War. With limited exceptions, the provisions of Hague XIII received, in both 
wars, the adherence of both neutrals and belligerents. It may also be noted that at the time 
of their conclusion the Hague Conventions regulating sea warfare-insofar as they departed 
from nineteenth century practice-were more commonly regarded as a concession to belliger-
ent-rather than to neutral-pretensions. 
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